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TAIWAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1970s: A CASE 
STUDY OF ADAPTATION AND VIABILITY* 
THOMAS J. BELLOWS** 
1 
A series of diplomatic-political setbacks in the early 1970s 
suggested that Taiwan - i.e., the Republic of China (ROC) -
would progressively suffer political isolation. The political 
isolation would lead to economic and cultural isolation, and the 
viability and independent status of Taiwan would draw to a close. 
A nadir of sorts occurred when the ROC walked out of the U.N. 
General Assembly on October 25, 1971. A motion to declare the 
expulsion of Taiwan an "important question," requiring a two-
thirds vote, failed by a four vote margin (55 to 59, 15 abstentions). 
Taiwan's position was not helped by the fact that Henry 
Kissinger, then Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, was on his second visit to Peking at the time the General 
Assembly debated the China question. Immediately after the vote, 
the ROC Foreign Minister, Chou Shu-kai, announced that his 
government "would not take part in any further proceedings of 
the General Assembly." Since the admission of the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) to the United Nations, there have been 
efforts to relegate the ROC to the status of a non-country. It is no 
longer included in any U.N. statistical reports. The most visible 
reminder of the ROC's earlier membership, a marble plaque 
carrying a quotation from Confucius that was a gift of the ROC, 
was quietly removed in August 1972. A New York Times editorial 
pointedly assessed the practical absurdity of such actions: 
An international statistical summary that ignores this 
living reality is diminished in its authority - and so is the 
agency that issues it. But the U.N. authorities have even 
stooped to the Communist device of trying to rewrite history. 
At U.N. headquarters here, a plaque identifying the Republic 
of China as donor has been removed. . . . Such petty 
manipulation cannot erase the substantial contributions of 
the Republic of China to a quarter-century of U.N. history. 1 
* Originally published in Asian Survey, Vol. XVI, No.7 (July 1976). Reprinted 
with minor revisions with the permission of the author and the University of 
California Press. 
** Professor and Chairman of Political Science Department at the University 
of Arkansas, Fayetteville. 
1. New York Times, August 10, 1972. 
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Potential isolation had threatened two decades earlier. Mter 
the start of the Korean War, the ROC was extricated from a 
situat1on in which it appeared that the U.S. was preparing to 
accept a Communist seizure of Taiwan. President Truman made a 
statement in January 1950, which partly foreshadowed the 
Shanghai communique 22 years later, declaring that Taiwan was 
a part of China and that the U.S. would not provide military 
assistance to the Nationalists of Taiwan.2 
Subsequent reversal of this position and renewed American 
commitments to Taiwan began with the Korean War. By 1971, 
however, it was obvious that the United States had set into 
motion a process of accommodations vis-a-vis the PRC. This was 
manifestly symbolized by the two Kissinger trips to China and the 
July 15 announcement that President Nixon would soon visit the 
PRC. The Shanghai Joint Communique of February 27, 1972, 
reaffirmed what both the ROC and the PRC maintain, that 
Taiwan is a part of China. Some have interpreted the American 
statement in the communique as evidence that American 
commitment to Taiwan was drawing to a close: 
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on 
either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one 
China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States 
Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its 
interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by 
the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it 
affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. 
forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the 
meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military 
installations on Taiwan as the tension diminishes.3 
The American position was amplified at a news conference in 
Shanghai the same day when Henry Kissinger told reporters that 
American defense obligations under the 1954 Mutual Defense 
Treaty remained unchanged. 4 • 
Subsequent actions decreased the American military presence 
in Taiwan, but not in a way meant to indicate that diplomatic 
abandonment was imminent. The number of American military 
personnel has been reduced to 900, less than one-quarter the 
2. Harry S. Truman, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: 
Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, 1950 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 11. 
3. Department of State Bulletin, LXVI:1708 (March 20, 1972), pp. 437-438. 
4. Ibid., p. 428. 
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number stationed there in mid-1963 prior to the Vietnam buildup. 
U.S. military advisers were withdrawn from Kinmen (Quemoy) 
and Matsu in mid-1976.4a Two squadrons of F-4 Phantom jet 
fighters were removed, one to the Philippines in the summer of 
1974, while the other was withdrawn in May 1975.5 These 
squadrons had been stationed in Taiwan in January 1973, to 
replace 48 F -5A fighters that Taiwan had loaned to South 
Vietnam. American interest in Taiwan's air defense continues, 
however. The ROC has entered into a joint production arrange-
ment with the Northrup Corporation to construct 100 F-5E 
"Tiger" fighters at a cost of $2 million each. The U.S. has 
extended over $150 million in credits through 1978 for construc-
tion of these interceptors at a plant near the city of Taichung.6 
The first F-5E fighter rolled off the assembly line on October 30, 
1974, the late President Chiang Kai-shek's birthday. 
ROC officials are extremely sensitive about any U.S. govern-
ment action which suggests a diminishing interest in Taiwan. For 
example, following the death of President Chiang Kai-shek on 
April 5, 1975, discussions within the American government and 
between the U.S. and Taiwan governments continued for a week 
over the stature of the U.S. delegation that would attend President 
Chiang's funeral. Domestic political pressures and the ROC's 
intense concern culminated in the naming of Vice-President 
Rockefeller to head the U.S. delegation. 
There was displeasure in Taipei with the October 1974 
Congressional repeal of the Formosa Resolution. This resolution 
had been approved on January 29, 1955, at a time when Quemoy 
(the largest island in the Kinmen complex) and the Matsu Islands 
were under heavy daily bombardment from the mainland, and 
eight weeks after the signing of the Mutual Defense Security 
Treaty between the U.S. and the ROC on December 2, 1954. The 
Formosa Resolution made it the President's responsibility to 
4a. News from China, June 25, 1976. 
5. The withdrawal was based on an "understanding" reached between 
Taiwan and the U.S. in November 1972. No State Department announcement was 
made at the time of the May withdrawal, although a few press reports appeared in 
June quoting State Department sources. As of December 31, 1975, there were 2,000 
American military personnel in Taiwan, 135 American civilian direct hire, and 992 
foreign national direct hire. 
6. The F -5E Tiger II is a single accommodation interceptor. It is designed to 
be used against the MIG-17, -19, and -21. The Almanac of World Military Power 
reports that figures available as of mid-1974 show that the PRC had 1,000 MIG-19 
fighters, 1,500 MIG-15/17 fighters and 300 MIG-21/F-9 interceptors. All PRC 
bombers are outclassed by the Tiger II. 
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determine if an attack on Quemoy or Matsu was related to the 
defense of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands (or Pescadores) and to 
respond accordingly. Congress thus endorsed the President's 
power to use American forces to resist an attack on Quemoy and 
Matsu under certain circumstances. The repeal of this resolution, 
however, did not change basic American commitments under the 
1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. The key article in the treaty is 
Article V which states that an attack in the West Pacific area 
against the territories of either the U.S. or the ROC is considered 
dangerous. Such an attack requires each country to "act to meet 
the common defense in accordance with its constitutional 
processes." The territorial focus of the treaty is Taiwan and the 
Penghu Islands. Quemoy or Matsu are not disregarded, however, 
because Article VI refers to "such other territories as may be 
defined by mutual agreement."7 
Both American and ROC officials are quick to point out that 
the repeal of the Formosa Resolution did not jeopardize American 
defense commitments to Taiwan. The cornerstone from Taiwan's 
point of view is the 1954 treaty. If this should be modified in any 
way by President Ford, substantial foreign policy adjustments 
might have to be made in Taipei. Despite the 1971 and subsequent 
diplomatic setbacks, the diplomatic status of the ROC remains 
viable as of early 1976. 
The impact of earlier diplomatic trends which were quite 
discouraging in 1970 and 1971 has been modified. The stabilizing 
of the ROC's overall position results primarily from the flexibility 
and initiative shown by government officials in Taipei. Taiwan 
faced the distinct possibility of becoming the orphan of Asia, if 
not a world orphan. The trend toward derecognition first appeared 
in 1970 when the PRC returned to the diplomatic world scene and 
began actively seeking out diplomatic ties after the 1S69 Ninth 
Party Congress (see Table 1). Recognition of the PRC accelerated 
with its admission to the United Nations (see Table 2). There were 
fewer recognitions in 1973, but the pace quickened in 1974, and 
included important countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 
The challenge of diplomatic isolation continues with the Philip-
pine recognition of the PRC in June and Thai recognition on July 
1, 1975. This article analyzes the ROC's strategy for survival. The 
ROC's viability might have been totally undermined as formal 
7. For background on American treaty commitments to the ROC, see U.S. 
Senate, Committee on Foregin Relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Vol. I, Parts 1-4, 
91st Congress, 2d Sess., 1971, pp. 927-931. 
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political support and participation at the international level 
eroded, but it has not. 
Table 1. Countries Recognizing the PRC between 
January 1, 1970 and October 24, 1971 
-------------------------------------------------------
Canada* 
Equatorial Guinea 
Italy* 
Ethopia 
Chile* 
Nigeria 
Cameroon* 
Kuwait* 
San Marino 
Austria 
Sierra Leone* 
Turkey* 
Iran* 
* Countries previously recognizing Republic of China. 
10/13170 
10/15170 
1U06/70 
11121/70 
01115/71 
02/10/71 
03/26171 
03/27171 
0.'5/06 '71 
05/2ll!71 
07/29/71 
08/05/71 
08/17171 
Unchanging Principles and Changing Strategy 
The selection of President Chiang's eldest son, Chiang Ching-
kuo, as Premier on May 16, 1972, signified important changes in 
the Taipei polictical scene. Within a few days, the popular Foreign 
Minister, Chou Shu-kai, was replaced by Shen Chang-huan. 
Ambassador Shen had served as Foreign Minister between 1960 
and 1966 and immediately prior to his appointment was 
Ambassador to Thailand. A more cautious individual, he was less 
given to public comments. The new Foreign Minister at one time 
was the late President Chiang's interpreter and apparently is 
close to Madam Chiang. 
For some time stories had been circulating that Taiwan was 
engaging in formal discussions with the Soviet Union and might 
expand relations to fill a vacuum should the Americans withdraw. 
On at least two occasions, an "unofficial" Soviet representative 
visited Taiwan. Former American ambassador to Taiwan, Walter 
P. McConaughy, has publicly stated that in 1969 "a Soviet 
correspondent was allowed to visit Taiwan."H Soviet correspond-
ent and reputed KGB agent, Victor Louis, visited Taiwan in 
November 1971, and had informal talks with Foreign Minister 
8. Ibid. 
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Table 2. Countries Recognizing the People's Republic of China 
since October 24, 1971 (listed chronologically) 
Belgium* 10/25/71 Chad* 11/28172 
Bhutan 10/25/71 Australia* 12/22172 
Peru* 11/02171 New Zealand* 12/22172 
Ecuador* 11/09/71** Spain* 03/07173 
Lebanon* 11/09/71 Upper Volta* 09/15173 
Rwanda* 11/12/71 Guinea Bissau 09/30173 
Iceland 12/14171 Botswana* 03/25174 
Cyprus* 12/14/71 Malaysia 05/31174 
Malta* 01131172 Trinidad and Tobago* 06/20/74 
Mexico* 02/14172 Venezuela* 06/28174 
Argentina* 02/19172 Niger* 07/16174 
Bahrain 04/10172 Brazil* 08/15174 
Greece* 06/05172 Grenada 10/10174 
Guyana 06/27172 Gambia* 12/17174 
Japan* 09/29172 Portugal* 01106175 
West Germany 10/11/72 Philippines* 06/09175 
Maldives* 10/14172 Thailand* 07/01175 
Gabon* 10/16172 Bangladesh 10/01175 
Malagasy Republic* 11/06172 Fiji 11/05175 
Luxembourg* 11/16172 Comoro Islands 11115175 
Jamaica* 11/21172 Western Samoa* 11/13175 
Zaire* 11/24172 Cape Verde Islands 04/25176 
Central African 
Empire* 08/25/76 
Barbados* 01111177** 
* Countries previously recognizing Republic of China. 
** Date of severing relations with the ROC. 
Chou.9 Chou may have played a role in arranging for these visits 
and informally supported such contacts when talking to corres-
pondents. Chou's replacement by· Shen in 1972 was partly 
interpreted as a rejection of such policies at that time. 10 There also 
were rumors and speculations that Taipei might enter into 
unofficial discussions with PRC officials. In order to end these 
speculations, Premier Chiang outlined four "unchangeable princi-
ples" of foreign policy to the Legislative Yuan on September 29, 
9. The Far Eastern Economic Review, 88:26 (June 27, 1975), p. 5, correctly 
reported that Victor Louis visited Taiwan again in December 1974 for top-level 
meeting with Nationalist leaders. 
10. In a recent, far-ranging and often critical analysis of America's domestic 
and international condition, Madame Chiang Kai-shek attacked detente between 
the U.S. and the PRC, but in the case of U.S. Soviet relations observed: "With the 
present mature and reasoned leadership in the Kremlin, detente embodies the 
necessary goodwill to build upon." Madame Chiang Kai-shek, "We do beschrei it," 
Free China Review, XXV:5 (May 1975), p. 22. 
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1972. The unequivocally anti-Communist principles included 
"national recovery" of the mainland. 11 The hard line in practice is 
implemented through a pragmatic strategy of survival and 
growth: 1) strengthen existing diplomatic relations; 2) encourage. 
foreign trade and foreign investment in Taiwan; and 3) "all out" 
diplomacy which stresses economic, technical, cultural and 
educational interaction with selected countries, regardless of 
whether or not the country officially recognizes the ROC. 
Economic Conditioners. A major factor in the ROC's 
survival is its economic position and emphasis on international 
trade. Taiwan is in the highest decile of countries when 
calculating the percentage of GNP exported. Through 1974, as 
Table 3 shows, the role of foreign trade in its economy has grown 
remarkably. Significant modifications in the interdependence of 
the ROC and the world economy would require a major 
reorientation of Taiwan's entire economic structure. 
A brief review of the ROC's economy reveals a shift between 
1952 and 1974 from a principally agricultural country to 
diversified agriculture and industry with emphasis on foreign 
trade. Total foreign trade in 1952 was $303 million, while in 1975 
the total was $11.254 billion12 (all dollar amounts in this article 
are U.S. dollars). Sugar and rice alone accounted for 80% of the 
exports in 1952, while agricultural products and processed 
agricultural products together constituted 95% of 1952 exports. 
During 1975, industrial products accounted for 83.6% of the 
exports, processed agricultural products were 10.8% of the total 
and agricultural products constituted 5.6%.13 
Taiwan's economic progress since 1952 is an example which 
other countries might well review. Taiwan has: (1) stressed labor 
intensive industry; (2) labor intensive agriculture; (3) geographi-
cally dispersed industry; and (4) tied agricultural development in 
with industrial development, one manifestation being the emer-
11. Two of the four principles clearly implied that the ROC would not become 
the Republic of Taiwan, and it would not cooperate with the Soviet Union. The four 
principles are reproduced in Republic of China, China Yearbook: 1972-1973 
(Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1973), p. 9. 
12. Economic Planning Council, Executive Yuan, Taiwan Statistical Data 
Book, 1974, p. 168; and China Post, January 9, 1976. 
13. Percentages were obtained from K. T. Li and W. A Yeh, Public Policy and 
Economic Development on Taiwan (Taipei: Council for International Economic 
Cooperation and Development, April 1969), p. 4; and Free China Weekly, XVII:4 
January 25, 1976), p. 1. 
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Table 3. Percentage of GNP Expected 
ROC ROC Comparison - 1973 
1952 8.5 1970 27.1 U.S.A. 5.4 
1955 6.3 1971 33.0 Japan 8.9 
1958 8.6 1972 40.8 France 14.3 
1961 11.1 1973 47.8 United Kingdom 17.5 
1964 16.9 1974 39.8 West Germany 19.3 
1967 17.9 1975 35.1 Canada 21.2 
Sources: Percentages for ROC derived from data in Economic Planning 
Council, Executive Yuan, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1974 (Taipei: Republic of 
China, June, 1974); the China Post, January 15 and February 18, 1975; Republic of 
China, Weekly Newsletter, No. 139, (January 27, 1976), p. 3; and Free China 
Weekly, XVII:3 (January 18, 1976), p. 4. Percentages for the comparison were taken 
from United States-Japan Trade Council. A Comparison of Selected Economic 
Data (Washington, D.C.: United States-Japan Trade Council, 1975). 
gence of a substantial agri-industrial system. 14 Taiwan is a 
prototype of agricultural, industrial, market and export develop-
ments complementing one another and advancing together. The 
export thrust is significant because it has involved so many 
aspects of the economic system and hence has brought benefits to 
most elements of the population. 
Strengthening Official Interactions. During the 1970s, 
· ·---the ROC had emphasized strengthening diplomatic ties, cultural 
and educational exchanges, and commercial relations such as 
trade and foreign investment, the latter not completely controlled 
by the official foreign policy institutions. This section analyzes 
those parts of Taiwan's global interactions which are entirely 
government controlled. The trend of official diplomatic relations 
has not favored Taiwan. Between 1963 and mid-1975, countries 
formally recognizing the ROC dropped from 66 to 26 while the 
number recognizing the PRC went from 50 to 112. In 1976, the 
ROC lost the Central African Empire (formerly a Republic) and 
Cape Verde Islands, but elevated its consulate-general to embassy 
status with the Republic of South Mrica. In addition, ROC lost 
Barbados at the beginning of 1977. 
14. In 1963, for example, processed agricultural exports totaled $149 million 
and in 1974 the total was $592 million. Dollar amounts taken from Board of 
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Foreign Trade Development in the 
Republic of China, p. 16; and China Post, January 15, 1975. 
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It is difficult to stop the current world trend toward 
recognition of Peking, but Taipei is making great efforts to 
reinforce existing relations and stabilize the number of countries 
recognizing the ROC. This is a difficult objective. President 
Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines visited the PRC in June 
1975, and announced from Peking that as ofthat date diplomatic 
relations were established between the two countries. The joint 
communique stressed non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs. A trade agreement was signed the same day. Taipei 
worked diligently between Mrs. Marcos' ten-day visit to the PRC 
in September 1974 and the June announcement to dissuade the 
Philippines from recognizing Peking since ROC officials were 
convinced, correctly so, that Thailand would recognize Peking 
within a few days of the Philippine recognition. Thai recognition 
occurred on July 1, 1975, during a visit by Prime Minister Kukrit 
to Peking. Singapore may then, as its own leaders have predicted, 
be the last ASEAN nation to establish diplomatic relatiom with 
the PRC. 
Continued American recognition is important if a respectable 
modicum of official diplomatic relationships is to be maintained. 
Premier Chiang recently enunciated what he regarded as the first 
practical objective of Taiwan's foreign policy: "We shall do our 
utmost to maintain bilateral relations with friendly countries and 
especially to strengthen our alliance with the U.S." 15 
Taiwan opened two new consulates in the U.S. during 1973-74 
(Atlanta and Kansas City) and reactivated the consulate in 
Portland. These offices publicize the ROC's political position and 
facilitate the expansion of commercial ties between the two 
countries. Official ROC policy for well over a year has been that 
Taiwan's favorable balance of trade with the U.S. should be 
reduced, and an effort is being made to import more American 
goods. In some cases importers are encouraged to place orders 
with American firms, even though Japanese or other countries of 
origin goods might be less expensive. 
Trade also follows and stabilizes the diplomatic flag in other 
cases. The past year has witnessed considerable exchanges of 
dignitaries between Taiwan and Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and 
Central American countries recognizing the ROC, as well as 
efforts to expand trade with these friendly countries. Foreign 
assistance is also used to strengthen ties, though in the case of a 
15. Free China Review, XXIV:10 (October 1974), p. 16. This strategy was 
reiterated to the author in conversations he had with government officials in 
Taipei. 
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donor nation such as Taiwan these must be selective and not 
require massive expenditures. 
The first major technical assistance effort which proved 
politically successful began in the 1960s. This effort was 
stimulated by the 1960 U.N. General Assembly vote when the 
ROC lost two votes, dropping to 42, while the PRC gained five, up 
to 34. A diplomatic campaign began, with emphasis on Africa. 
During 1960, 17 states were admitted to U.N. membership, 16 of 
them in Africa. Between 1960-62, 23 African countries gained 
independence. Thirteen recognized the ROC; five recognized the 
PRC; and five recognized neither. Eight African nations which 
abstained on the U.N. China vote in 1961 voted against the PRC 
in 1962. At the time the Cultural Revolution drew to a close in 
mainland China in 1969, the ROC had diplomatic relations with 
24 African countries. In part, this was a result of the PRC's 
diplomatic ineptitude of the 1960s. It was also a consequence of 
Taiwan's export of an "agricultural revolution" to parts of Africa. 
This was not a case of aid leading to subversion, but aid, among 
other objectives, sustaining needed diplomatic support. 
During the 1960s and through 1971, one political payoff of 
these missions was the support African nations gave the ROC. 
Another story was the incessant and relatively successful push of 
the PRC's "smiling diplomacy" during the 1970's to reduce the 
number of countries recognizing Taiwan in Africa and Latin 
America. Table 4 summarizes the ROC's exchange missions 
which remain important in maintaining a small nucleus of 
recognition for the ROC in Africa and Latin America. 
Table 4. Number of ROC Personnel Participating Annually in 
Overseas Technical Missions (Unit: 1 person) 
1961 1964 1967 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Africa 15 
Latin America 
Other 29 
121 
6 
96 
518 
22 
100 
702 
48 
63 
738 
23 
40 
721 
52 
49 
479 
82 
60 
255 
103 
51 
204 
120 
7 
Sources: Secretariat, Committee of International Technical Cooperation, 
International Technical Cooperation (Taipei: Committee of Intemational Techni· 
cal Cooperation, 1974), pp. 2-3 and Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976, pp. 232-233. 
Missions go almost exclusively to countries recognizing the ROC. 
Selected technical assistance, then, is an important aspect of 
Taiwan's overall diplomatic effort. Because a majority of the 
countries recognizing the ROC are small, developing countries, a 
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nation such as the ROC can have some economic and political 
impact, despite the inherent fiscal limitations on its efforts. A 
dependable albeit small base of countries will provide the 
minimum necessary for international legitimacy. Taiwan con-
tinues to hold memberships in at least 15 international organiza-
tions, including the Asian Development Bank, IMF, World Bank, 
and the International Development Association. Without a 
nucleus of formal recognition, official participation in interna-
tional organizations would be rather difficult unless an official to 
China recognition policy was followed by several countries and 
was tolerated by both the ROC and the PRC. Despite adverse 
circumstances, Taiwan's diplomatic policies have been surpris-
ingly successful. 
Trade and Investment 
International trade and investment have been important in 
the development of Taiwan's economy. They also are influential 
in maintaining ties with countries recognizing the ROC and 
facilitating interaction with countries which do not recognize 
Taiwan. This section seeks to show how Taiwan's visibility and 
sovereignty are relevant to various private groups and organiza-
tions throughout the world. Wide trade contacts and substantial 
international investment should help to convince non-
governmental groups and also governments that useful purposes 
are served if Taiwan maintains its sovereignty. 
Trade. Table 3 indicated the predominant position of 
foreign trade in Taiwan's economy, and suggested this degree of 
dependence was among the highest in the world. Recent increases 
are phenomenal. The spectacular increases began in 1970 when 
total trade was $2,952 billion as compared to $12,620 billion in 
1974, $11,254 billion in 1975, and $15.67 billion in 1976.15b 
The expansion of foreign trade has not been without its 
problems. The largest trade deficit ever recorded, $1,356 billion, 
occurred in 1974. The ROC is limited in the restrictions it can 
impose on imports, though in part as a result of a drop in total 
trade, the 1975 deficit was reduced to $611 million. The 1976 
surplus was $490 million. 15b 
During the last two decades consumer goods have averaged 
only 5.5% of imports; the remainder were either capital equipment 
15a. Free China Weekly, December 31, 1976, p. 1. 
15b. Ibid., January 10, 1977, p. 1. 
16. China Post, January 18, 1976. 
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(31.7% in 1975) or agricultural and industrial raw materials (61.6% 
in 1975).16 Furthermore, Taiwan, at least initially, has been 
vulnerable to the multitudinous international inflation recession 
pressures. The actual economic growth rate in 1974 was 0.6%, the 
lowest since 1952 when economic development began, 17 but by 
1975 it was 2.8% and in 1976 it was 11.5%.178 Importation of 
petroleum products increased by only 10% in 1974, but import 
costs went up $400 million, or 133%.18 
There also are positive indicators in the Taiwan economy 
which should not be disregarded. Both the wholesale and urban 
consumer price indexes dropped in January 1975, when compared 
to December 1974. The budget surplus for the 1974 fiscal year was 
$399.5 million, bring the total cumulative surplus to $963.2 
million. Foreign exchange reserves actually increased by 5.5% 
between January 31, 1974, and January 31, 1975.19 The Export-
Import Bank committed a $500 million loan in January for 
purposes related to the "Ten Basic Projects" referred to below. 
During January/February 1975, two American banks loaned $800 
million for major construction projects. The level of official and 
private American financial commitment is high. 20 
Despite these positive signs, discussions the author had with 
ROC officials suggested that a more inward looking attitude 
toward development is emerging. This is supported by occasional 
public statements such as Premier Chiang's statement that 
Taiwan's "economy cannot depend wholly on exports and our 
domestic market is yet to be developed." 21 The combining of 
various construction programs into the "Ten Basic Projects" and 
the determination to go ahead despite rising costs, is an 
acknowledgement that Taiwan's economic infrastructure needs 
updating, not only to facilitate foreign trade programs but to 
provide the necessary basis for expanding domestic economy. The 
expansion of heavy industry which parallels the "Ten Basic 
Projects" will reduce the need to import capital goods (31.7% of 
17. Ibid., February 6, 1975. 
17a. China Daily News, December 31, 1976, p. 1. 
18. Ibid., January 3, 1975. 
19. Data supplied by the Department of State. 
20. Support for the ROC by the Export-Import Bank of the U.S. has been 
exceptional. Cumulative support from its inception in 1934 through June 30, 1974, 
excluding the recent loan, was $1.683 billion. Only three developing countries 
received more from Eximbank during this period - Brazil, Mexico, and Iran. The 
total loaned to Asia for this period was $13.337 billion. Export-Import Bank of the 
United States, Cumulative Records (Washington: Eximbank, 1975), pp. 36-90. 
21. Free China Review, XXIV:10 (October 1974), p. 20. 
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imports in 1975) and will enable Taiwan to supply a greater share 
of its own industrial needs. It also can better compete in terms of 
exporting a larger percentage of capital intensive, more technolog-
ically sophisticated goods. 
Foreign trade will not be deemphasized, but there is growing 
recognition that the domestic market can be better developed so 
that national well-being should not completely depend on foreign 
trade. A certain caution and critical review of the international 
economic situation is apparent. Once reason for this concern was 
observed by the author when he recently visited the Nantze 
Export Processing Zone in Kaohsiung. One of the few American 
owned companies operating in this particular EPZ manufactures 
and exports Indian motorcycles for the American market. Output 
was 1500 units per month, half the plant's capacity. The necessity 
of foreign trade is obvious, but there are the now obvious dangers 
of fluctuating markets, layoffs, and economic turndown. There is 
a new realism, and a manifestation of new and cautious attitudes 
about the role of foreign trade as the ultimate and immutable 
underpining of Taiwan's domestic and international positions. 
Taipei is also attempting to diversify its trade and reduce its 
dependence on a few countries. There has been diversification in 
terms of dollar amounts, but in percentage distribution the data is 
less encouraging as shown in Table 5. In 1952, Japan and the 
United States provided 67% of Taiwan's imports (the former 44.7% 
and the latter 22.2%) and took 56% of its exports (52.6% to Japan 
and 3.5% to the U.S.). 22 The percentage share between Japan and 
the U.S. had adjusted over the years, but the excessive percentage 
concentration on the two countries remains. Trade with Europe is 
increasing, but total trade with Asian countries other than Japan 
continues to drop because of the percentage decline in exports. 
The government has had some success in encouraging the 
direction of trade. Taiwan ranked 16th in countries exporting to 
the U.S. in 1974 and was lOth in terms of purchasing American 
goods. 2~ During the past 30 months considerable effort has been 
expended on increasing American imports and reducing Taiwan's 
favorable trade balance. The China Post has noted that in 1973 
and 1974 the ROC was America's 12th largest trading partner in a 
field of 145. This newspaper, which reflects the government's 
views in fl -~ ign affairs, predicts that Taiwan will rank 7th by 
22. Industry of Free China, XIX:6 (June 1963), pp. 110.115. 
23. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1974, 
96th edition (Washington: GPO, 1975). 
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Table 5. ROC's Major Trading Areas by Percentage of Total 
Exports/Imports 
Exports Imports 
U.S.A. Japan Europe Asia* U.S.A. Japan Europe Asia* 
1963 16.4 31.7 8.6 31.2 41.7 29.7 7.2 7.5 
1966 21.8 24.0 9.7 32.8 26.7 10.4 8.8 7.9 
1969 38.0 15.0 9.9 32.2 24.1 44.2 9.7 9.1 
1972 41.8 12.3 11.3 17.5 21.6 11.5 9.1 11.3 
1973 37.4 18.4 12.9 15.8 25.1 37.6 12.3 11.3 
1974 36.1 15.0 14.6 20.0 24.1 31.8 14.6 22.7 
1975 34.3 13.2 15.0 23.1 27.8 30.4 12.6 21.2 
Sources: (1) Taiwan statistical data book 1976, pp. 184-193 and (2) Board of 
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economical Affairs, Foreign Trade Development in the 
Republic of China (Taipei: China Art Printing Works, 1974). pp. 22-27. 
* Other than Japan. 
1976.24 Diversification or reorientation of trade sometimes can 
complement or facilitate political objectives.25 
Taiwan does, however, face difficulties in its U.S. trade in 
addition to the current state of the American economy. The global 
recession has generally taken a heavy toll on textiles and 
electronics, and these are two of its principal industrial exports. 
Furthermore, Taiwan must compete against Hong Kong and 
South Korea, who also export heavily to the U.S. and who have 
been among the world's leading countries in building an industro-
export program. Despite those handicaps, Taipeh sees a para-
mount need to strengthen its trade relations with the United 
States. 
Taiwan's second most important trading partner is Japan, 
but there are serious difficulties here as well. Taiwan's trade 
deficit with Japan was $1.336 billion in 1974, just $20 million less 
than its entire trade deficit. The Board of Foreign Trade decided in 
the fall of 1974 to license certain imports from Japan and limit the 
importation of Japanese spare parts. During 1974 the Board 
imposed restrictions on 700 Japanese commodities and in January 
1975 the sourcing of 104 "non-essentials" was limited to the U.S. 
24. See, for example, China Post editorials of March 19, 197 4, and February 20, 
1975. 
25. The PRC is even more obvious in its use of trade to achieve political 
objectives. A recent news story reported that the PRC sold 75,000 tons of high 
speed diesel fuel to Thailand at the "friendship" price of 93 cents per ton, $12 
cheaper than the world market price! Bank of America, Asia Representative Office, 
China Spotlight, 2:5 (May 1975), p. 4. 
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and Europe. These restrictions have produced only limited results. 
The trade deficit with Japan in 1975 was $1.101 billion, a drop of 
$235 million compared to 1974 but nearly double Taiwan's overall 
1975 deficit of $611 million.26 The trade deficit with Japan 1976 
was roughly estimated to be the 1974 figure. 26a 
Juxtaposed against the trade imbalance is the competitive 
advantage many Japanese goods have and the long-standing 
trade relationships which are difficult to realign. One economist 
has concluded that during the 1970s, 72 to 86% of Japanese 
exports will be heavy industrial goods. 27 One reason Taiwan 
imports so much from Japan is its industrial surge. It is difficult 
to forego these Japanese purchases if quality is competitive and 
prices are lower. Proximity is also a contributing factor. Earlier 
Japanese rule of Taiwan and postwar trade patterns have 
reinforced ROC/Japanese commercial relations.28 
International Investment. International investment pro-
vides needed economic input, technical skills, and marketing 
networks. It also is a reason for many private groups to have a 
special interest in Taiwan's independent status. External invest-
ments from 1952 through 1975 totaled $1.405 billion.29 Overseas 
Chinese provided 29.2% of the total figure, with the balance 
officially classified by the ROC as "foreign investment." Two-
thirds of the external investment, 67.4%, has come into Taiwan 
since 1969. Nearly one-third of the aggregate external investment 
($446 million) has come from the U.S., 23.5% more than the 
overseas Chinese total ($361 million). External investment in 1975 
was slightly over $118 million with $70.9 million classified as 
foreign investment and $47.2 million from overseas Chinese 
sources. American investors provided 58% of the total 1975 
"foreign investment" and the Japanese share in 1975 dropped 
26. Republic of China, Weekly Newsletter No. 139, January 27, 1976. 
26a. China Daily News, January 6, 1977, p. 1. 
27. Donald R. Sherk, "Post-Vietnam Asia: Trade and Investment Trends in the 
Pacific," Pacific Community, V:2 (January 1974), p. 245. 
28. Japan is anxious to augment the level of commercial transactions between 
the two countries. In a major foreign policy statement before the Diet on January 
24, 1975, Foreig. 'vtinister Miyazawa noted that "There will be no change in our 
policy of maintaining business-like relations with Taiwan," Japan Report, XXI:5 
(March 1, 1975, Special Supplement), p. 2. 
29. Georgie Wang and Margaret Han (eds.), Free China Today (Taipei: Epoch 
Publicity Agency, 1974), p. 109; and China Post, January 13, 1975 and January 12, 
1976. 
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sharply to 19.7% as compared to 35.7% in 1974. External 
investment in 1976 was 150 million, 27% above 1975.29a 
External investment reveals two immediate problems. First is 
the impact of the international economy. Taiwan's incoming 
investments during 1974 showed an increase of 4.13% over the 
same period in 1973.30 But by the end of 1974, incoming 
investment was 23.9% below 1973, although 1974 was the second 
highest year ever recorded. There was another sharp decline of 
37.6% in 1975, although the total 1975 investment of $118,175.000 
was still a respectable sum given the global economic situation. A 
sustained decline in external investment could, however, have 
negative political as well as economic implications. 
A second, at least potential problem has been the substantial 
level of Japanese investment. The author's discussions on Taiwan 
indicated that while ROC/Japanese trade patterns need adjust-
ing, there were no overt or covert efforts to discourage Japanese 
investment. Other than an outright limitation on Japanese 
investments, which the ROC cannot afford, there may be no 
alternative other than substantial Japanese investment balanced 
by diversification and increasing dollar investments from other 
countries. One economist concludes that overseas Japanese 
investment is shifting to labor intensive, lower-wage industries 
because of the rapidly rising Japanese wage scales. Therefore, we 
are entering a new era of Japanese foreign investment31 which 
will maintain the attractiveness of Taiwan. There are inherent 
limitations which preclude any major modification of ROC/ Japa-
nese commercial relations. 
International investment facilitates ROC's domestic economic 
development as well as builds the distribution and marketing ties 
that a trading nation like Taiwan requires. Such investment also 
manifests political commitment and confidence by private groups 
which will contribute to the future political survival of the ROC. 
ROC Relation§hips With Countries Not Having 
Diplomatic Ties 
ROC government officials regularly point out that Taipei has 
economic, cultural, and educational ties with over 110 countries. 
Premier Chiang not long ago reaffirmed ROC's intentions "to 
29a. China Daily News, January 1, 1977, p. 2. 
30. Asia Research Bulletin, IV:5, Part 3 (October 31, 1974), p. 20. 
31. Donald R. Sherk, "Post-Vietnam Asia" (supra note 27), p. 249. 
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maintain relations with friendly countries." He did not limit 
friendly countries to those that had not recognized the PRC, but 
said: "more than a hundred countries continue to maintain 
economic, trade and cultural relations with us. We shall never 
permit the Communists to succeed in their sinister designs to 
isolate us. ":12 
Dating back to 1971, Taiwan adopted a more flexible foreign 
policy. One unusual example is the Libyan Arab Republic. 
Although Libya recognized the PRC in June 1971, ambassadors 
were never exchanged, and the ROC embassy in Tripoli remains 
open. Taiwan also reacts less immediately when a country 
recognizes the PRC. Gambia, for example, recognized the PRC on 
December 12, 1974, but it was not until December 28 that Taipei 
formally announced that it would suspend its diplomatic relations 
with Gambia. During the intervening two weeks it was possible 
for the ROC embassy to effect other unofficial ties which would 
not sever all contact between the two nations. The breaking of 
diplomatic ties does not mean the end of all substantive ties. In 
fact, as the following examples show, unofficial transactions may 
grow. 
A rank-ordering of Taiwan's top ten trading partners in 1973 
- U.S.A., Japan, West Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Singapore, and the Nether-
lands (ranging from $2.63 billion to $131 million total trade) -
reveals that only one among the "top ten," the United States, 
maintains formal diplomatic relations with Taipei. West Ger-
many, for example, recognized the PRC in October 1972, yet this 
did not curtail ROC/West German interaction. West Germany is 
Taiwan's leading European trading partner. Trade between the 
two countries tripled between 1972 and 1975, with a trade total of 
$690 million in 1975, and Germany enjoying a favorable balance 
of $55.4 million. Scholarships were exchanged between the two 
countries in 1973, and 300 nurses recruited from Taiwan are 
serving in German hospitals.aa 
An interesting Asian case is Indonesia which has recognized 
the PRC for more than two decades. Following the decimation of 
the Parti Kommunis Indonesia in 1965-66, links between Jakarta 
and Taipei began to evolve. Trade climbed from a total of $100,000 
32. China Post, November 25, 1974. 
33. China Yearbook, 1974 (Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1974), p. 356; and 
China Yearbook, 1975 (Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1975), p. 356. 
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in 1963 to $345.2 million in 1975.34 The largest trade increase 
(78.6%) occurred between 1972-73. Most ROC contracts in Indone-
sia are handled through the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. 
Figures on private ROC business investment in Indonesia are 
difficult to secure, but are substantial. Many of these investments 
are joint efforts with Indonesian military/business elites. This 
latter transnational movement of funds and ventures is a factor 
which has led some elements in the present Indonesian leader-
ships to oppose reopening ties with Peking, though formally 
Jakarta still recognizes the PRC. 
Japan recognized the PRC in September 1972. Within two 
months, Taipei and Tokyo staffed organizations in the opposite 
capitals which were responsible for practically the identical work 
previously handled through the embassies. Taiwan opened the 
Association of East Asian Relations in Tokyo and Japan 
established the Interchange Association in Taipei. Key personnel 
in both organizations were either retired diplomats or diplomats 
on leave. Both the total volume of trade and Japanese investment 
have increased since 1972. 
A 130 member Diet mission visited Taipei in October/No-
vember, 1974 to honor President Chiang Kai-shek on his 
birthday.35 A major point of discussions held then was a 
resumption of air links after they had been severed in April1974. 
The ROC had terminated the air pact between the two countries 
eighteen months after Tokyo recognized the PRC, when the 
Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira had publicly declared that 
China Airlines was not "considered a carrier representing a 
state."36 Following extended negotiations, CAL air links with 
Japan were formally reestablished in an agreement signed on 
July 9, 1975. JAL has established a 100% owned subsidiary, Japan 
Asia Airways, which will be the Japanese airline on the 
Tokyo/Taipei route. The action which ultimately led to the 
resumption of flights was Foreign Minister Miyazawa's statement 
34. Board of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Mfairs, Foreign Trade 
Development in the Republic of China, 1974, pp. 21-22; and China Post, January 
13, 1976. Taiwan had a $9.6 million favorable trade balance with Indonesia in 
1975. 
35. The bulk of the mission was from the pro-ROC Dietmen's Association for 
Sino-Japanese Relations, which has over 100 members from the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party. 
36. New York Times, April 21, 1974. 
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that the Nationalist flag is regarded as a national flag by those 
countries recognizing the ROC.37 
The Japanese case is the most notable example of linkages 
being sustained despite a political rupture which a few years ago 
would have led to opposite results. Similar arrangements have 
been made with the Philippines and Thailand. Taiwan's energetic 
foreign relations, which include the active participation of 
government departments such as the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Economic Affairs, and Education, as well as many 
private groups, has been remarkably successful to date. Taiwan is 
not internationally isolated despite diplomatic setbacks which 
only a few years ago might have led to an inevitable and 
progressive political deterioration. 
Taipei/Peking Relations 
With some degree of regularity, Peking announces its 
determination to "liberate Taiwan." One of the more recent 
announcements was delivered at the first session of the Fourth 
National People's Congress by Chou En-lai in January 1975 when 
he spoke of "the noble aim of liberating Taiwan and unifying the 
motherland."38 
Pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC follows an ebb 
and flow process. Early 1973 saw some pressure on Taipei to work 
out a modus vivendi with Peking. General Fu Tso-yi, former 
Nationalist commander of Peking, urged the Kuomintang to 
"come together and talk." 
If you are not prepared to enter into formal talks right 
away, then send some people to the mainland openly or 
secretly, to have a look and visit relatives and friends. You 
can rest assured that the PRC government will keep the 
matter secret, keep its word and guarantee your safety and 
freedom to come and go. 39 
The ROC rejected the invitation out of hand, but its officials 
must always be alert to political and cultural appeals from the 
mainland. Offers of autonomy and the right to retain Taiwan's 
37. South China Morning Post, July 12, 1975. Peking is most unhappy about 
the resumptif'- rf flights. An important consideration in Tokyo was the fact that 
JAL is sufferin6 financially. For the first time in its twelve-year existence, JAL 
experienced a deficit in 1974 ($143 million), the year Taipei terminated the 
profitable CAL/JAL flights. Ibid., July 13, 1975. 
38. Peking Review, XVIII:4 (January 24, 1975), p. 25. 
39. Straits Times, March 2, 1973. 
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socio-economic system can sometimes elicit a sympathetic 
interest. A statement delivered in 1973 to government officials by 
a Ministry of Defense official is one example of the effort by ROC 
officials to educate middle-level government people: 
... there are other leftists who have gone even a step 
further in following the words of Chou En-lai, by spouting off 
conditions for "unification" such as "Taiwan can be made a 
special autonomous region, be exempt from taxes a few years, 
and its industry and business allowed to operate, with a 
guarantee that present living conditions can be maintained." 
This is the tune harped on by those off-key Chicom 
mouthpieces. Look at the autonomous regions on· the 
mainland. Aren't they good examples? And what about that 
guarantee to continue business and industry. Look at what 
happened to "national capitalists" who remained on the 
mainland after the Chinese Communist takeover.40 
Since 1973 there has been an ebb in pressures to enter into 
negotiations. ROC officials were obviously relieved in late 1974 by 
earlier statements the late Chou En-lai had made at least twice to 
visiting Japanese delegations when he commented that the 
"Taiwan question" probably would not be settled by his genera-
tion of leaders.41 Logically this is realistic because the historical 
enmities between present Nationalist and Communist leaders 
preclude meaningful preliminary negotiations. Moreover, there is 
no reason for the ROC to want any form of affiliation with the 
mainland in the foreseeable future. 
The late Chou En-lai and those who support his policies 
believe that a period of long waiting is preferable to a two-China 
compromise. American officials reported little direct pressure on 
the U.S. over this question through late 1974. The PRC appears to 
be more concerned with some form of stability in Asia, a 
continued American presence, and a more activist effort to counter 
Soviet activities in Asia. Activation of the Taiwan issue could be 
dysfunctional in terms of these goals, At the same time, the PRC 
40. Ministry of Defense statement, March 1973, mimeographed. 
41. Senator Hiram L. Fong (R-Hawaii), who visited both the PRC and the 
ROC, reported a similar statement by Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua who 
said that "maybe a hundred years" would pass before a relationship between the 
PRC and the ROC occurred. Congressional Record, 120:164 (November 24, 1974), p. 
519956. 
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fears Soviet-ROC contacts and currently emphasizes the peaceful 
unification of Taiwan and the mainland.42 
CONCLUSION 
Through early 1974, PRC pressures on the U.S. to recognize 
Peking were restrained. Our present de facto and not always clear 
two-China policy could be subject to dramatic shifts following the 
1976 presidential election. Some form of "normalization" with 
Peking will continue, but it would be unfortunate if the U.S. 
severed diplomatic ties with the ROC. Taiwan's foreign policy has 
been innovative and effective. Extensive relations between 
Taiwan and the United States have been beneficial to both 
countries. To break diplomatic ties with Taipei now would under-
mine the ROC's foreign policy and reveal an unrealistic American 
aloofness to a stabilizing presence in the Pacific Basin. 
Taiwan is a nation heavily dependent on international 
transactions. It has been skillful and adept at surviving 
diplomatic setbacks dating back to 1970. Despite its multitudinous 
international ties and interests, there is an inward looking 
psychological orientation emerging. This in part results from the 
precarious international economic situation and a desire not to be 
excessively dependent on fluctuations in the international 
economy. ROC officials hope to reduce the annual increase in 
foreign trade from the 20% average between 1968-74 to 12% in the 
coming years. Also present in Taiwan is a sense of nation-
building and a growing interest in domestic matters which are 
distinguishable from international/domestic problems. Official 
statements using the term "bastion" imply that overriding 
concerns are not what they might have been 30 years ago or what 
they will be 50 years from now. Speaking before the Kuomintang 
Central Committee in November 1974, Premier Chiang Ching kuo 
summarized the guidelines formulated at various meetings of the 
party Congress and Central Committee. The first point listed was: 
"Consolidating the bastion of national revival in Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and making models of these places."4:J 
42. Harold Hinton interprets passage of four Soviet naval vessels through the 
Taiwan Straits on May 12, 1973, two days before David Bruce arrived in Peking as 
Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office, as a suggestion "that the developing relationship 
between the L ted States and the People's Republic of China might be countered 
by one between the Soviet Union and the Republic of China." Harold C. Hinton, 
Three and a Half Powers: The New Balance in Asia (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1975), p. 110. No reference to this naval passage appeared in the 
New York Times of the period. 
43. China Post, November 25, 1974. 
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Taiwan's diplomacy and domestic developments during the 
1970s have been more successful than many might have thought 
possible.44 It has withstood the Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger visits 
to the PRC. Taiwan's international relations have helped to 
provide the government and the political system with the 
confidence and the capacity to confront and solve problems, to 
adjust consciously political strategy to attain objectives, and to 
survive. The success of its international relations is principally 
the result of imaginative policies pursued by ROC officials over 
the past several years. These efforts would be inhibited by an 
American diplomatic shift involving the formal recognition of 
Peking, which would not serve to sustain and protect American 
interests in the Pacific Basin. 
44. On March 9, 1977, the Ministry of Foreign Mfairs of Ecuador announced 
that the ROC would set up a commercial office in Quito. The office will also handle 
consular affairs. News from China, p. 77-215 (March, 1977). 
